Meeting Date: March 26, 2008

Subject: Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension Project Delivery Strategy Process

Action Item: X


It is recommended that the Commission:

  1. Approve the Project Delivery Strategy (PDS) process as outlined in this report noting that the PDS process was previously approved by the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension Executive Task Force at its meeting of February 19, 2008, and further noting that staff will report back on the findings and conclusions of the PDS process with recommendations for the Commission to consider.
  2. Forward this report to the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension Executive Task Force and the Move Ontario Trust for information.


Sufficient funds for this expenditure are included in the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension Project, as set out on pages 1521 to 1526 of the TTC 2008-2012 Capital Program (category Expansion), which was approved by City Council on December 11, 2007.


The overall scope of the Project comprises an 8.6 kilometre extension of the TTC’s YongeUniversity-Spadina Subway, from its existing terminus at Downsview Station to a new terminus at Vaughan Corporate Centre. The Project includes six new stations, of which three are in the City, two are in the Region and one, Steeles West Station, straddles the City/Region boundary.

The estimated cost of the Project, unescalated (July $ 2006), is $2.090 billion. When considering costs at year of occurrence the estimated final cost in 2015 is $2.633 billion.

In early 2006, the Province of Ontario (Province) announced Provincial approval and a funding contribution of $670 million for the TYSSE Project.
In late 2006, the Region and the City in separate reports to their respective Councils approved the Project and combined funding for one-third of the final cost with an apportionment of 59.96% (City) and 40.04% (Region).

On March 6, 2007, the Federal Government announced that it would contribute an amount capped at $697 million for the Project.
In January 2008, the Province announced a further contribution of $200 million ($ 2008). This contribution along with the previous contributions from the City, Region and the Federal government provides full Project funding.

In March and April 2007 separate Environmental Assessments undertaken by the TTC/City and Region were approved by the Province’s Ministry of the Environment.

Based on a preliminary scheduling analysis, it will take from seven to eight years to deliver the Project and commence revenue service to all stations.

At the time of writing, the approvals, agreements and initiatives that have not yet been finalized but are well advanced include:

  • Federal Environmental Assessment
  • Memorandum of Understanding – Operating
  • Capital Cost Apportionment Agreement 
  • Building Canada Fund (BCF) Business Case Report
  • Contribution Agreement

To manage the contributions from the funding partners and other financial aspects of the Project, the Province set up the Move Ontario Trust with one member each from the City, Region and Province.

In October 2007 the TYSSE Executive Task Force, consisting of three members each from the City and the Region began meeting regularly. The purpose of the ETF is to oversee the Project progress and deal with issues of inter-regional interest on the Project.

From the outset of the Project, there have been discussions, investigations and analysis with regard to adopting the best strategy to contractually deliver the Project.
There was also a requirement from the Federal Government in its guidelines for the Building Canada Fund (BCF) Business Case that Public Private Partnership (P3) options be screened for this purpose. The P3 analysis was carried out in late 2007. It recommended the elimination of a number of options as not viable considering the circumstances of the TYSSE Project. Detailed analysis and adoption of the preferred options(s) was left to the Project Manager to pursue.

In the course of Project development, TYSSE staff undertook a number of initiatives to assist in the identification of the preferred PDS. These included various workshops, investigations, surveys and research. They are noted further in the following part of this report.


All parties have agreed that the TTC will construct, own, operate and maintain the sub-surface subway extension and integral surface elements of the subway including entrance structures, emergency exit buildings, power sub-stations and ventilation shafts.

The Region will be responsible for other surface facilities including passenger pick-ups and drop-offs (PPUDOs), bus platforms and parking lots within the Region.


The Project is proceeding on the basis that the following criteria for contracting the subway extension has been accepted:

  1. The TTC is the Project Manager and the design and construction of the subway extension will be in accordance with TTC’s standards, procurement policies, practices and procedures. 
  2. A Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension Department is organized as a Department within the TTC’s Engineering & Construction Branch for the purpose of managing the Project.
  3. The design and construction of the Project work will be largely (over 90%) undertaken by private sector firms procured by the TTC for the purpose.
  4. Where required, subject matter expertise for technical issues and staff for construction to undertake custom TTC work will be provided by the TTC.


The intended objective of the PDS is to adopt a process whereby the following objectives are met.

  1. Achieves cost effectiveness, constructability and facilitates scope containment expectations.
  2. The schedule is optimized and schedule co-ordination is efficient.
  3. The construction meets a high level of performance, quality, structural integrity and efficiency.
  4. The Project meets life cycle, maintainability and operating performance requirements.
  5. Fulfils expectations for a high level of involvement in the Project by the private sector in management, design, construction and product supply.


The PDS is expected to arrive at conclusions and recommendations on the type of contracts that will be used to procure construction services for the Project. It may also identify other efficiencies and benefits with regard to design features. These will be employed by TYSSE staff to define the structure of the contracts. A list of contracting options is attached as Appendix 1.

TTC’s mandate includes the design, construction, ownership, operation and maintenance of the subway extension. The options involving assignment or transfer of these responsibilities to the private sector are not being considered. These include:

  • Operation and Maintenance Contracts
  • Design-Build Contracts to include any of: operate, own, maintain
  • Lease Purchase Contracts

While they may ultimately prove impractical, the following options are being retained for further consideration for now:

  • Design Bid Build (DBB)
  • Design Build (DB)
  • Construction Management (CM)
  • Design Build Finance (DBF)
  • Design Bid Build Finance (DBBF)

Observations/Conclusions from Previous Investigations

In Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, the findings and listing of representative projects with regard to contracting strategy are listed.

Appendix 2 itemized a number of findings from investigations, workshops and surveys that TYSSE staff and others undertook in the development of a PDS. The TYSSE staff
assessment of these findings is included.

PDS Process

TYSSE will proceed to complete the PDS as follows:

1. TYSSE will employ the services of an external Value Analyst (VA) with the requisite expertise for the purpose of analyzing the retained options for contracting the work, in accordance with the accepted criteria.

The VA will convene workshops and undertake further investigations and analysis. For the purpose of efficiency, the contracting packages will be formed into the elements outlined in Appendix 4. The VA will recruit the necessary subject matter expertise to enable these exercises.

The VA will recommend a preferred contracting approach for the following elements individually or in combination.

  • Sheppard West Station
  • Finch West Station
  • York University Station
  • Steeles West Station
  • Highway 407/Transitway Station
  • Vaughan Corporate Centre Station
  • Tunnel
  • Cut and Cover Running Structures
  • Wilson Yard Structure Modifications

The preferred contracting and construction approval for the systems work and the remaining Project elements will be analyzed collaboratively by the VA, TTC and TYSSE staff and recommendations made accordingly. These include:

  • Signals
  • Trackwork
  • Communications
  • Traction Power

2. The VA will organize a forum likely in the form of a workshop for presentation of views by local contractors. The proceedings from this forum will be documented, analyzed and considered in arriving at the conclusions and recommendations of the PDS.

3. Under the guidance of the VA, the Project will be provided with conclusions and level of risk expected for the individual contract packages and the TYSSE overall contracted work to be expected for:

  • Value-for-money
  • Cost certainty
  • Scope containment
  • Schedule compliance
  • Operational and maintenance integrity
  • Product quality
  • Litigation, safety, third party

4. Provide recommendations with regard to due diligence and technical exercises to mitigate risks for inclusion in contract documents. For example:

  • Convening of Underground Construction Peer Review Board
  • Mediation/Arbitration in contract documents
  • Inclusion of Dispute Review Board
  • Partnering provisions in contracts
  • Application of Liquidated Damages
  • Practical level of milestone identification
  • Level of geotechnical information provided (Geotechnical Baseline Report)
  • Third-party involvement in Project
  • Allocation of risk in contract documents to the party best able to manage the risk
  • Securing Escrow Documents on major contracts

5. Concurrent with or immediately following the above, TYSSE Project Management will undertake further investigations possibly in concert with the VA to optimize the most efficient contract packaging. It will look at and assess processes, contract features and technologies specified in those contracts that have been successful in other jurisdictions.

6. Following the conclusion of the above exercises, TYSSE staff will be in a position to commence procuring contracts in a manner consistent with TTC policies and procedures.

7. The VA will be a consulting engineering firm who has staff specializing in this field, likely certified by the Canadian Society of Value Analysts. This assignment may also include value engineering as a following option. Subject to satisfactory performance on the PDS, and availability of resource skill, the VA firm will be retained to coordinate value engineering for the design of the stations, tunnels and possibly other major elements. Value Engineering will be a discreetly separate technical exercise subsequent to the PDS recommendations.

The VA may also require external and TTC expertise such as financial experts, scheduling, estimating and constructability specialists to assist in the PDS exercise.

8. As it is expected that in both DB and DBB options, preliminary design needs to progress by TYSSE to the about 20%-30% stage, designers will be retained, design advanced prior to the conclusions and recommendations of the PDS being finalized. Initial design information will also be helpful in the PDS exercise. The following designs are expected to be initiated:

  • Comprehensive geotechnical investigation and preparation of a Geotechnical Baseline Report
  • Design of six stations and running structures
  • Design of the tunnels
  • Alignment design
  • Other technical and design exercises as required

Schedule Going Forward

Subject to the approval of the PDS process by the ETF and Commission, the following will be mandated:

  • A Request for Proposal to retain a VA will be drafted and issued following Commission approval.
  • A VA consultant will be retained.
  • If the ETF and TTC approval timetable is maintained, conclusions and recommendations from the PDS are expected to be available by October 2008.
  • The ETF will be informed of the recommendations and conclusions of the PDS and TYSSE’s contracting schedule.
  • In the event that the PDS conclusions and recommendations are not consistent with TTC policy and procedures, the further report to the TTC will indicate the inconsistency and recommend a course of action for the Commission’s recommendation. Likewise, this will be reported to the ETF.
  • A significant delay in adopting contract procurement options(s) will impact the overall Project schedule.


Approval of this process will conclude in adoption of a Project Delivery that will optimize schedule, cost, operating efficiencies and other benefits for the Spadina Subway Extension Project.

March 5, 2008 50-2-1

Procurement Options for TYSSE Contracts

1. Design Build (DB)

Contract whereby a private sector contractor both designs and builds the infrastructure.

  • Design Build Operate Maintain (DBOM)

A variation of DB whereby a private sector contractor designs, builds and subsequently operates and maintains the infrastructure.

  • Design Build Operate (DBO)

A variation of DB whereby a private sector contractor designs, builds and subsequently operates the infrastructure.

  • Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO)

A variation of DB whereby a private sector contractor designs, builds, finances the construction and subsequently operates the infrastructure.

  • Design Build Finance (DBF)

A variation of DB whereby a private sector contractor designs, builds and finances the building of the infrastructure.

2. Design Bid Build (DBB)

A contract whereby the transit owner designs (or retains an engineering firm to design) and tenders the construction which is built by a private sector contractor.

  • Design Bid Build Operate Maintain (DBBOM)

A variation of DBB whereby a private sector contractor also operates and maintains the infrastructure.

  • Design Bid Build Operate (DBBO)

A variation of DBB whereby a private sector contractor also operates the infrastructure.

  • Design Bid Build Finance (DBBF)

A variation of DBB whereby a private sector contractor also finances the building of the infrastructure.

3. Alliance

A negotiated contract whereby the transit owner and a private sector contractor negotiate a contract to deliver a transit project such that the two parties share the risk and benefits.

4. Construction Management (CM)

A contract whereby a private sector contractor manages sub-contracts for the building of the transit infrastructure for a fee.

  • Construction Management at Risk (CM at Risk)

A variation of CM whereby the private sector contractor assumes all or part of the cost risk for cost overruns.

5. Other

There are also a number of other contract procurement options, as follows:

  • Build Own Operate
  • Buy Build Operate
  • Build Own Transfer
  • Lease Purchase

The titles are largely self-explanatory and are not defined further herein.

Findings from Investigations of Procurement and Project Delivery for Transit Infrastructure Projects

1. Sheppard Subway (1995-2002)

In 2002 the TTC successfully completed the construction of the 6.4 km Sheppard Subway essentially on budget and on schedule. This subway was constructed almost exclusively applying the design/bid/build procurement and contracting approach. This method has been the established and preferred method for the TTC to deliver its major transit projects.

Staff Assessment

While the TTC has on occasion adopted other approaches such as Design Build it has found success with Design Bid Build and considers it a proven and viable method of delivering major transit infrastructure.

2. Ontario Power Generation (OPG) Niagara Tunnel Project

The site was visited by TTC Engineering and Construction staff on July 21, 2006 and presentations from OPG project staff were received. This is basically a large diameter tunnelling contract. It was contracted to an overseas firm as a design/build contract where the basic elements of the project were identified by the owner (OPG) and the contractor designed the tunnel, purchased and assembled the tunnel boring machine and undertook construction.

Risk appears to have been allocated based on the principle of allocation to the party (OPG or contractor) best able to manage the risk.

Staff Assessment

The contracting method used has not been used by the TTC for tunnelling in the recent past. While the primary purpose of the site investigation was to observe the technology, the project delivery method to the extent that information was obtained appeared to merit further consideration for TYSSE.
TYSSE staff have been monitoring the progress of this project.

3. Consulting Engineering Workshop

On July 26, 2006 TTC staff conducted a workshop with senior representatives of three large engineering firms with extensive experience in constructing major civil, systems, transit and railway infrastructure.

The purpose was to assess the merits of various procurement strategies. In particular those that appeared to need consideration for the TYSSE were:

  • Design Bid Build (DBB) - conventional TTC project delivery method
  • Design Build (DB) - often used in other transit projects
  • Construction Management (CM)
  • Design Build Operate and Maintain (DBOM) – has been used on some transit projects
  • Hybrid or combinations of the above

Given the specific circumstances of the TYSSE Project, the panel excluded DBOM as a viable option and it was sceptical as to the viability of Construction Management for the entire Project.

The TYSSE is an 8.6 km extension of a larger system. Conveying ownership and maintenance of this section to another operator and at the same time integrating the extension into the existing system in a seamless manner was viewed as risky.

Documentation from this workshop has been retained in the TTC TYSSE Project files.

Staff Assessment

Staff concluded that the senior engineering representatives did not see merit in DBOM or versions of DBOM for procurement and delivery whereby the operation and maintenance of the extension becomes the responsibility of another party.

In general, the workshop concluded that DBB or DB were candidates for further consideration.

4. Canada Line

TTC staff visited the site, received presentations and held discussions with senior staff from the Canada Line Project, the Sea to Sky Highway Project and the Independent Engineer for the Canada Line on August 2-3, 2006.

The Canada Line is a stand-alone Light Rapid Transit (LRT) line constructed with contribution from various levels of government and the private sector using the DBFOM project delivery approach. A private contractor/concessionaire will build, operate and maintain the line and provide approximately 35% of the $1.9 billion financing for the project. The private firm will receive compensation in the form of revenue earned through a 35 year concession to operate the line and also from government subsidy on an ongoing basis.

The overall procurement was an extensive process requiring a significant length of time to finalize.

Staff Assessment

The TTC staff concluded that as a stand alone project the procurement philosophy and financing, maintenance and operation approach adopted by the Canada Line was viable. However, the circumstances of the TYSSE are quite unlike those of the Canada Line and using the DBFOM method for the TYSSE was not appropriate.

There were direct elements to the Canada Line project delivery methodology such as the use of an Independent Engineer, utility and property agreements that merit further consideration for application on TYSSE.

5. Construction Industry Interviews

On August 1 and 8, 2006, TYSSE/TTC staff interviewed three senior representatives of local construction firms known to have the resources to carry out contracts in excess of $200 million.

The intent was to obtain their views on contracting out a large subway infrastructure project using DB or DBB. There was no discussion with regard to other contracting strategies.

While there were minor differences in views, these representatives had no major objections to either method. All indicated a slight preference for DB provided that:

  • The contract package was large ($100 million or more).
  • The risks are properly allocated.
  • The system work and integration would be the responsibility of the owner.
  • Significant preliminary design is undertaken by the TTC due to custom subway technology.

All accepted DBB as viable on all size contracts and preferred if:

  • Contract packages were small (less than $100 million)
  • There were multiple contractors at the same location
  • TTC or other public sector agency employees were involved in construction on the same site
  • Extensive custom or specialized design was required

Documentation from the interviews are retained in the TTC TYSSE Project files.

Staff Assessment

It seemed to staff that large DB contract was looked on favourably by large contractors for the construction of the “shell”, i.e., tunnels and station boxes with station fit-outs, custom features, systems left to the owner.

6. Other Transit Projects

Staff reviewed available information on many major transit or similar projects that were active in August 2006 and could provide some information.

A list of those projects reviewed is listed in Attachment 3. This was done using anecdotal and web site information. No follow up investigations were carried out on most of the projects to confirm the accuracy of the information.

The following seems to have been occurring on the 21 projects.

  • 9 DBB
  • 7 DB
  • 3 Mix of DBB and DB
  • 1 Design/Build/Finance/Operate/Maintain (DBFOM)
  • 1 DBOM

In the above there seems to have been no example of an existing subway line being extended by any other method than DBB.

While the success of 19 project delivery strategies was not investigated further, other than in a hearsay manner, the information obtained suggests that various methods to finance, design, construct, own, operate and maintain transit projects are being used. The favoured methods in North America appear to be either DBB or DB with responsibility for the financing, ownership, operation and maintenance being retained by the transit agency.

7. Various Workshops, Conferences, Presentations

  • Infrastructure Ontario – Knowledge Workshop and Presentation (Toronto, November 2006)
  • Canadian Urban Transit Association Conference (Toronto, November 2006)
  • American Public Transit Association Conference (Toronto, June 2007)
  • Rapid Excavation Tunnelling Conference (Toronto, June 2007)
  • Various presentations, enquires, submissions from consulting engineers, suppliers and contractors

TYSSE/TTC staff attended a number of events at the above venues with regard to the delivery of transit projects.

Information from these exercises have been retained and were considered at the time as to their applicability for the TYSSE.

Staff Assessment

There were interesting notions introduced at some of these sessions that have potential for TTC infrastructure projects. There were also some specific technologies or processes that have been initiated that could have some application on the TYSSE Project.

Considering the particular circumstances on the TYSSE with regard to financing, ownership, operation and maintenance, staff concluded that these sessions confirmed that the viable options for project delivery of the TYSSE were likely DB or DBB or variation(s) of the two.

8. TTC Pilot Design/Build Project – York University Busway

As part of reconsidering its project contracting strategy on the numerous projects it manages, TTC identified the York University Busway as a good candidate for DB. For the procurement exercise TTC reviewed its standard contract documents, retained the services of outside expert legal counsel and DB contract specialists, and undertook a thorough and extensive re-development of the standard contract documents to be used on DB contract work. These documents are now in place. 

Staff Assessment

While it is too early to confirm the success of this approach, this contract will be revisited before major contracts for the TYSSE are tendered, particularly if DB is chosen.

9. Direct Investigations of Major Transit

A preliminary in-office investigation of a number of transit agencies was carried out to gather information, specifically to assist in the development of a Project Delivery Strategy for the TYSSE Project.

The transit agencies with ongoing activity that were considered of most interest and potentially provide valuable technical, contractual and other information were the following:

  • New York City (MTA)
  • Seattle (Sound Transit)
  • San Juan (Tren Urbano)
  • San Jose (VTA)
  • Denver (RTD)
  • Chicago (CTA)

Because of constraints with time, stage of projects, etc., the following were chosen for investigation:

a) Denver T-Rex (RTD)
b) Seattle Link Rail (Sound Transit)

This was for the purpose of investigating performance of ongoing contract procurement/project delivery options. Also, pending development of the Project Delivery Strategy, a further investigation is proposed for the purpose of investigating contract packaging for adoption on the Project. This will occur following ratification of the Project Delivery Strategy.

a) Denver Regional Transit District (RTD)

Denver RTD was chosen as reports received, information on records, and discussions indicated that it recently completed a large transit project (T-Rex) successfully using almost exclusively DB as its contracting strategy. Also, RTD was now embarking on an extensive expansion (FasTracks) of its system at a cost of somewhere between $4.8 billion US (approved) and $6.2 billion US (projected final cost).

RTD staff arranged for a series of meetings and presentations during the investigation. The RTD staff and consultants that were made available for discussion, volunteered documents and offered whatever information they had. This information has been retained.

The Denver T-Rex Project included a $1.2 billion DB contact consisting of a highway portion and LRT portion approximately equal in value. By all accounts the project was successfully delivered using DB.

The LRT required some adoption of LRT technology already in operation at RTD but was generally a stand alone initiative with little integration with the existing system. There was no tunnelling or major sub-surface work. Both the LRT and the highway were turned over to the respective public agencies on schedule.

Staff Assessment

The T-Rex project confirmed that a large full scope and stand-alone transit infrastructure project including systems work can be successfully prosecuted by DB.

b) Seattle Sound Transit

Seattle was chosen as it had a previous attempt in the late 1990’s to construct an LRT line employing DB contracting. This was halted due to problems with DB. Specifically, this was for work including extensive tunnelling for which the tendered contract bids far exceeded the estimated cost and budget. The DB approach was abandoned largely because of this issue.

After a lengthy postponement, Sound Transit is again proceeding with the LRT expansion plan including extensive tunnelling. The contracting approach of this project is DBB. The total estimated cost for the three approved segments is $3.87 billion US, including $2.07 billion US for the Initial Segment where construction work is proceeding.

Sound Transit arranged for a series of meetings and presentations during the investigation. Information from the investigation has been retained.

The setback suffered by Sound Transit in the late 1990’s was the consequence of a LRT contract estimated at around $450 million using DB. The contract, which consisted largely of tunnelling and sub-surface work, was bid at over $800 million by three bidders.

Following investigations, the project was postponed and Sound Transit reorganized. It undertook a thorough due diligence exercise of its contracting strategy. Following a six to seven year postponement, work has now restarted.

The current project work is being carried out solely using DBB. This is a requirement of the Washington State Department of Transportation and direction from the Sound Transit Board of Directors.

There has been a significant amount of design completed and construction is ongoing. As best as could be determined, work is proceeding well.

Staff Assessment

Based on what information that could be obtained, Sound Transit’s reasons for choosing DB and the specifics of the DB contract in the mid 1990’s were flawed and caused a significant delay in introducing improved transit in Seattle and area.

The ongoing work using DBB seems to be proceeding satisfactorily.

10.Screening of Private Public Partnership (P3) – Procurement Options for Building Canada Fund Business Case

As part of the Federal Government requirements for inclusion in the Building Canada Fund (BCF) Business Case Report for the Project, P3 Procurement Options were required to be screened.

Federal Government P3 screening guidelines were used.

The private consulting firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) was retained and undertook an analysis over a compressed period in late 2007. Input was provided by the City, Region, TTC, Province and TTC’s technical advisors.

A number of high level comparisons and analysis were carried out to eliminate impractical options and consider technical practicality, value-for-money, risk allocation, etc.

As a consequence of the evaluation undertaken by PWC, the viable options to be retained for further consideration are DB, DBB and DBF. While the analysis indicated some marginal cost differences, this high level analysis concluded that there was no significant difference in the options at this stage.

Staff Assessment

Staff believe that the PWC reaffirms that both DB and DBB are viable options for delivering the Project. It also introduces DBF as a viable option which has not been previously investigated by TYSSE staff.

11.Additional Information

TYSSE and other TTC staff have met and spoken with a number of external parties involved in the contract delivery of projects. These include:

  • Tunnel Boring Machine Suppliers
  • Tunnelling Experts
  • Tunnelling Contractors
  • Transit Consultants

Staff Assessment

Staff impressions from these discussions are considered in the context that the views of the participants may have been influenced by business interests. The following views seem to prevail.

  • Both DB and DBB were viable: -Large contractors favour DB -Small contractors favour DBB
  • Consultants generally favour DBB
  • There was concern that one large and complex contract of roughly $1.5 billion was not viable in the Toronto area for local contractors. 
  • DB contracts should be between $100 million and $300 million to be attractive to local contractors.

Project Elements and Projected Costs ($ 2006)

  1. Sheppard West Station  $52,221,136
  2. Finch West Station  80,792,624
  3. York University  72,627,126
  4. Steeles West Station  100,192,532
  5. Highway 407/Transitway Station  80,278,726
  6. Vaughan Corporate Centre Station  78,964,512
  7. Running Structure (tunnelling & Cut/Cover)  484,206,187
  8. Utilities (excludes stations)  19,834,813
  9. Trackwork  64,345,820
  10. Power (including DC Traction Power)  30,371,682
  11. Train Control (Signals)  33,206,910
  12. Supervisory Control  24,451,412
  13. Wilson Yard Modifications (structures, track, signals)  84,280,000
  14. Project Engineering, Management, Geotechnical, Permits,  Insurance, etc.  301,443,370
  15. Contingency (26%)  399,412,465
  16. Property & Miscellaneous  99,737,000
  17. GST Rebate  (117,248,793)